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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940044-CA 
v. : 
SOLOMAN LEE FORD, : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree felony 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (b) (Supp. 1994). This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) 
(Supp. 1994)• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly admit a holster for a 
semi-automatic handgun, a shotgun stock, and shotgun shells to 
support the State's contention that defendant possessed a semi-
automatic handgun and a shotgun? A trial court has broad 
discretion in deciding whether to admit evidence under rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 
1994) (dicta). Cf. State v. Branch. 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 
1987) ("'[w]e will not overturn the trial court's [403] ruling 
• . unless the abuse of discretion is so severe that it results 
in a "likelihood of injustice"'fl) (citations omitted), 
cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525, 
527 (Utah App.) (holding that this Court will not upset the trial 
court's ruling "absent manifest error"), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 
1105 (Utah 1990) . 
2. Has defendant overcome the presumption that his trial 
counsel represented him effectively where the record contains 
nothing to establish that the act defendant claims constituted 
deficient performance resulted from anything other than a 
prepared and reasoned tactical decision? Defendant's claim 
presents a question of law reviewed on the trial record because 
defendant has presented the claim for the first time on appeal 
without a prior evidentiary hearing. State v. Ellifritz, 835 
P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
3- Where defendant fails to specify how the cumulative 
effect of his assigned errors undermines confidence in the 
outcome and fails to establish any error, may he rely on a 
cumulative error argument to challenge his conviction? Whether 
the cumulative effective of individually harmless errors requires 
reversal turns on whether the errors as a whole undermine 
confidence in the outcome. State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, and one count of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree felony 
because the weapon was a firearm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-5-103 (1990) and 76-10-503 (2) (b) (Supp. 1994) (R. 6-8). The 
State tried defendant only on the possession of a dangerous 
weapon charge,1 and the jury convicted him on that charge (R. 
186, 766-67). After the jury returned its verdict, the State 
moved to dismiss the aggravated assault charge, and the trial 
court granted the motion (R. 773-74). The court sentenced 
defendant to the statutory indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
years (R. 248) . Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on 
January 19, 1994 (R. 251). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 19, 1993, Ms. Christine Gregg, defendant's 
girlfriend, returned to her apartment after a one-week absence 
(R. 587-88). Mr. Bruce Gunnell, a friend of Ms. Gregg's, 
accompanied her and sat on the couch in the living room while Ms. 
Gregg went to her bedroom to get some of her things (R. 591). 
Defendant, who was on parole from an armed bank robbery 
conviction, walked into the apartment and into the bedroom, 
cleaning what looked like a shotgun barrel and carrying three red 
1
 Defendant claims the trial court granted his motion to 
sever, but provides no record support. Appellant's Brief at 16. 
A minute entry states the trial court denied the motion (R. 71). 
Nevertheless, the trial court only read the possession of a 
dangerous weapon charge to the newly impaneled jury (R.559-60). 
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shotgun shells (R. 580-82, 591-92, 613-14). When defendant 
walked back out of the bedroom, he pointed a small-caliber semi-
automatic chrome handgun at Mr. Gunnell, cocked it, and told Mr. 
Gunnell to leave (R. 595-96). Mr. Gunnell hurried from the 
apartment, went to a nearby grocery store, and called the police 
(R. 596-97). 
When the police arrived at the apartment complex, they found 
defendant walking away from the complex (R. 623-24) . The 
officers searched defendant and the area between the complex and 
the place where they stopped him (R. 627-28). They also searched 
the area around the complex and the apartment of Ms. Pahl, the 
apartment next to Ms. Gregg's where defendant occasionally stayed 
and had stayed for approximately two days prior to the 19th (R. 
624, 628, 657). The officers never found the chrome semi-
automatic handgun or the shotgun barrel (R. 628, 642-43, 649). 
However, the search of the Pahl apartment produced a holster for 
a semi-automatic handgun, found on top of a china cabinet, and a 
red gym bag containing a shotgun stock and shotgun shells (R. 
629-33, 649-50, 652-53). According to Kody Pahl, Ms. Pahl's 
fifteen year old son, defendant left things at their apartment 
and brought gym bags with him (R. 662) Although Kody could not 
identify the gym bag in evidence as one of defendant's, he stated 
it was not his, his younger brother's, or to his knowledge his 
mother's (R. 660). 
Ms. Gregg reluctantly testified at the trial (R. 669-72) . 
She confirmed that defendant asked Mr. Gunnell to leave, and that 
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when he did, she saw something "silver" in his hand she thought 
was a gun (R. 677-78). She also testified about an occasion 
prior to the 19th when she saw defendant carrying something 
wrapped in a brown cloth that looked like a shotgun barrel,2 and 
holding yellow shotgun shells (R. 676-77, 681-82, 686). Finally, 
she testified that defendant carried a red gym bag, similar to 
the one in evidence, from the trunk of his car to the Pahl 
apartment (R. 675). 
Additional facts are cited in the argument sections to which 
they are relevant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Utah R. Evid. 403 determination. The trial court 
properly exercised its discretion to admit the holster for a 
semi-automatic handgun, a shotgun stock, and shotgun shells. The 
holster, discovered during a search of the apartment where 
defendant had been staying, provided circumstantial evidence to 
corroborate Mr. Gunnell's and Ms. Gregg's testimony that they had 
seen defendant holding a semi-automatic handgun that the police 
never found. The shotgun stock and shotgun shells supported the 
State's case that defendant possessed a shotgun: Mr. Gunnell saw 
only the barrel. Moreover, the holster, stock, and shells did 
not create a potential for unfair prejudice that substantially 
outweighed their probative value because none of them suggests 
decision on an improper basis. To the contrary, they provided 
2
 At first, Ms. Gregg testified she thought it was a 
shotgun (R. 676-77, 681-82), but on cross-examination clarified 
that she saw only the barrel (R. 686). 
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additional evidence directly probative of the central issue: 
whether defendant possessed one or more firearms. 
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant claims 
his trial counsel improperly opened the door to testimony about 
his parole violations by eliciting testimony from defendant's 
parole officer that defendant had no parole violations other than 
violations for the conduct for which he was on trial. The record 
and defendant's argument do not demonstrate a lack of any 
conceivable tactical basis for asking the question despite the 
risks. Moreover, opening the door to three unrelated parole 
violations, one of which was completely discredited and the other 
two of which were dissimilar to the charged crime, does not 
undermine confidence in the outcome when viewed against the other 
evidence that defendant possessed a firearm. 
3. Cumulative error. Defendant claims that even if the 
Court finds both his assigned errors harmless, their cumulative 
effect requires reversal. However, defendant simply states this 
conclusion without providing any analysis to explain why this is 
so. Moreover, he has not established that either constitute 
error. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE HOLSTER FOR A 
SEMI-AUTOMATIC HANDGUN, THE SHOTGUN STOCK, AND THE 
SHOTGUN SHELLS TO SUPPORT THE STATE'S CHARGE THAT 
DEFENDANT POSSESSED A FIREARM WHILE ON PAROLE FROM A 
FELONY 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (2) (a) (Supp. 1994) prohibits a 
person on parole for a felony from possessing a "dangerous 
weapon." Subsection (2)(b) makes the crime a second degree 
felony when the weapon is a firearm. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
501(2) (f) (Supp. 1994) defines firearm as "a pistol, revolver, 
shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any 
device that could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is 
expelled a projectile by any force." 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude the holster, 
shotgun stock, and shotgun shells taken from the Pahl apartment, 
basing the motion on rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(R. 131-32). The trial court denied the motion, finding the 
evidence highly probative because it went to the heart of the 
possession charge and that its potential for prejudice did not 
"weigh heavier" than its probative value (R. 552). On appeal, 
defendant claims the trial court erroneously admitted the 
holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun shells, arguing primarily 
that this evidence misled or confused the jury because the jury 
may have believed the parts constituted a "firearm," or that the 
presence of these parts equated to the actual possession of 
7 
"different handgun." Appellant's Brief at 9-14.3 Defendant's 
argument has not merit. 
A. Standard of review. 
Traditionally, the appellate courts have reviewed a trial 
court's rule 403 determination for abuse of discretion. See, 
e.g., State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987) ("'[w]e 
will not overturn the trial court's [4 03] ruling . . . unless the 
abuse of discretion is so severe that it results in a "likelihood 
of injustice"'") (citations omitted), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 
(1988); State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah App.) (holding 
that this Court will not upset the trial court's ruling "absent 
manifest error"), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has recently abandoned the 
traditional articulation of the standards for reviewing how a 
trial court applies legal principals to facts. The supreme court 
now describes these standards of review as a spectrum "consisting 
of many shades of variance" where the "closeness of appellate 
review of the application of law to fact actually runs the entire 
length of this spectrum." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 
1994) . 
3
 Defendant also argues that these items were irrelevant. 
Appellant's Brief at 8-9. However, defendant does not argue that 
these items had no tendency to make a fact of consequence more 
probable. Utah R. Evid. 402. To the contrary, defendant merely 
argues that these items had only minimal relevance, and that they 
distracted the jury from the relevant issues --an argument that 
addresses the trial court's rule 403 determination. The State 
therefore addresses the "relevance" of the evidence in its rule 403 
discussion of the evidence's probative value. 
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Defendant states that a trial court has "some" discretion in 
applying the law to the facts. Appellant's Brief at 2. To the 
extent this suggests the supreme court has narrowed the trial 
court's discretion in making rule 4 03 determinations, it ignores 
Pena's language to the contrary. In listing examples of points 
in the spectrum, the supreme court acknowledged that rule 403 
determinations fall at the end of the spectrum where the 
appellate courts accord trial courts broad discretion. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938 (dicta.) Therefore, the trial court had 
"considerable freedom" to admit or exclude the gun parts; freedom 
to make that determination even though tnis Court might not agree 
if it looked at the question ab initio, "in effect . . . the 
freedom to be wrong without incurring reversal." Id. at 937-38. 
B. The gun parts do not fall within the rule 403 
categories requiring special scrutiny, nor 
has defendant established that they should; 
therefore, they are presumptively admissible. 
A trial court must exclude relevant evidence where its 
potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its 
probative value. Utah R. Evid. 403. Generally, rule 403 creates 
a presumption of admissibility. See, e.g., State v. Dibello, 780 
P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Moore, 788 p.2d 525, 526 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court has carved out three categories of 
evidence that require special scrutiny: (1) gruesome photographs 
of a homicide victim's body; (2) a rape victim's sexual history; 
and (3) statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to 
quantitative analysis. See generally. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 
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at 1229 (Utah 1989). In these categories, the presumption shifts 
-- the potential for unfair prejudice presumptively outweighs its 
probative value -- due to the perceived unusual propensity of 
evidence in these categories to prejudice, inflame, or mislead 
the jury. Id. 
Defendant suggests the trial court should have presumed the 
gun parts inadmissible, but offers no argument to support this 
proposition other than asserting the gun parts tended to suggest 
decision on an improper basis. Appellant's Brief at 10-11. 
However, that proscription applies regardless of the presumption. 
Defendant offers no analysis to establish why the gun parts are 
more like gruesome photographs, prior sexual history, or 
questionable statistical evidence than they are like any other 
piece of physical evidence presumed admissible under rule 403. 
See, e.g., State v. Moore, 788 P.2d at 527 (refusing to apply the 
presumptively prejudicial standard to pornographic video tapes 
admitted in a prosecution for sexual exploitation of a minor). 
Because the gun parts do not fall into one of the three 
categories deemed presumptively inadmissible, they are 
presumptively admissible. Id. 
C. The holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun 
shells were highly probative circumstantial 
evidence that defendant possessed one or more 
firearms. 
The State predicated its case on defendant's possession of 
either a small-caliber, semi-automatic handgun or a shotgun (R. 
538-39) . The State offered and the court admitted the holster, 
shotgun stock, and shot gun shells to support this contention (R. 
10 
539-45, 552-56). Defendant claims this evidence lacked 
sufficient probative value. 
Defendant attacks the holster's probative value by asserting 
that no evidence linked it to defendant. Appellant's Brief at 
12-13. The record rebuts defendant's assertion. The police 
discovered the holster in the Pahl apartment, where defendant had 
stayed for at least two days, where he had stayed on prior 
occasions, and where he left his personal possessions (R. 628, 
652-53, 657). The Pahl apartment was next to Ms. Gregg's (R. 
624, 628). Therefore, the record contains evidence from which 
the jury could infer the holster belonged to defendant. 
Moreover, the holster provided circumstantial evidence to 
support Mr. Gunnell's testimony. Mr. Gunnell testified defendant 
pointed a small-caliber, semi-automatic handgun at him when 
defendant told him to leave Ms. Gregg's apartment; however, the 
police could not find this weapon (R. 595-96, 628, 649). What 
they did find was a holster that would fit a small-caliber, semi-
automatic handgun in the Pahl apartment where defendant was 
staying on the night he threatened Mr. Gunnell with a small-
caliber, semi-automatic handgun (R. 629-93, 649-53). Therefore, 
the holster was probative of the State's contention that 
defendant possessed a semi-automatic weapon. State v. McGrath, 
749 P.2d 631, 634 (Utah 1988) (trial court properly admitted drug 
paraphernalia and containers of suspected drugs, only a random 
sample of which had been tested, to support the State's 
witnesses' testimony that defendant was a supplier and that the 
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State's theory that there was an enterprise). See also State v. 
Moore, 788 P.2d at 527 (upholding the trial court's admission of 
pornographic videotapes despite defendant's stipulation that the 
tapes "(1) were pornographic; (2) contained material of a live 
performance depicting a nude or partially nude female; (3) were 
for the purpose of sexual arousal; and (4) contained material 
which would be harmful to a minor"). 
The shotgun stock and shells supported the State's 
contention that defendant also possessed a shotgun.4 Mr. Gunnel 
saw defendant cleaning a shotgun barrel, but saw no stock (R. 
591-92). Ms. Gregg saw what she thought was a shotgun barrel (R. 
681-82, 686) . Officer Gruber testified that the only piece of 
the shotgun missing from the pieces found in the gym bag and 
introduced into evidence was the barrel (R. 638-39). The stock 
supported the State's contention that defendant also possessed a 
shotgun. 
Similarly, the shotgun shells provided additional 
circumstantial evidence that defendant possessed a shotgun. Two 
witnesses saw defendant carrying shotgun shells and the police 
found the shells admitted into evidence in the gym bag with the 
stock. If defendant possessed only the shotgun barrel Mr. 
Gunnell and Ms. Gregg saw, he would have no reason to keep the 
shells, and especially would have no reason to keep them in the 
same bag as the other gun parts. Moreover, defendant's carrying 
4
 Defendant does not specifically identify how the shotgun 
stock and shells lacked probative value; rather, his argument 
focuses on his contention that they were prejudicial. 
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the shells suggested that defendant had either just removed them 
from the chamber or was about to put them in; he would have no 
reason to carry around shotgun shells on two separate occasions 
if he only had a barrel. 
Based on the above, the holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun 
shells constituted probative evidence corroborating the State's 
other evidence that defendant possessed either or both a semi-
automatic handgun and a shotgun. 
D. The holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun 
shells did not suggest a decision on an 
improper basis; to the contrary, thev went to 
the heart of the issue before the jury: 
whether defendant possessed a firearm. 
The bulk of defendant's argument focuses on whether the 
holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun shells created a potential 
for unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed their 
probative value. Appellant's Brief at 9-13. The potential for 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value when the 
evidence suggests decision on an improper basis. State v. 
Menzies, 2?r Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 28 (Utah 1994). 
Defendant claims the holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun 
shells misled and confused the jury by suggesting the jury could 
convict defendant on the basis of those parts alone. Again, the 
record rebuts this conclusion. Defense counsel argued that the 
exhibits and the barrel about which Mr. Gunnell and Ms Gregg 
testified did not meet the statutory definition of a firearm (R. 
752-54) . The State also conceded the shotgun stock was not a 
firearm until fitted with a barrel (R. 744). 
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Counsels' argument left no room for the jury to believe the 
holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun shells, by themselves, 
satisfied the statutory definition of a firearm. The jury could 
only have concluded that to convict defendant of a second degree 
felony, they had to find he possessed a semi-automatic pistol and 
all of the components of a shotgun. Therefore, the holster, 
shotgun stock, and shotgun shells, when put into context by the 
State and defense counsel, supported conviction on the 
appropriate basis: that defendant possessed a firearm. 
Based on the above, the trial court properly exercised its 
broad discretion to admit the holster, stock, and shells.5 
5
 Moreover, any error in admitting this evidence does not 
undermines confidence in the outcome. State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 
1221, 1229 (Utah 1989) (defendant must show that the erroneously 
admitted evidence undermines confidence in the outcome). Even 
without the holster, stock, and shells, the State had the 
corroborated and uncontradicted testimony that defendant cocked and 
pointed a small-caliber, chrome, semi-automatic handgun at him when 
defendant told him to leave Ms. Gregg's apartment (R. 595-96). Ms. 
Gregg confirmed that, when defendant told Mr. Gunnell to leave, she 
saw in defendant's hand something "silver" that she thought was a 
handgun (R. 677-78) . Moreover, both witnesses saw defendant 
cleaning a shotgun barrel and carrying shotgun shells (R. 591-92, 
613-514, 676-77, 681-82, 686). If defendant had only a barrel 
rather than an entire shotgun, he would have no reason to clean the 
barrel or to carry the shells with him. 
Defendant called only one witness: Ms. Sharon Hawkins. Ms. 
Hawkins could not rebut Mr. Gunnell's and Ms. Gregg's testimony. 
Although she testified she had never seen defendant with a chrome 
handgun, she admitted that she was outside of the apartment and not 
looking into it when Mr. Gunnell exited (R. 723). 
14 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTED DEFENDANT BY 
ELICITING TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANT'S PAROLE OFFICER 
THAT DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED NO PAROLE VIOLATIONS PRIOR 
TO THE CHARGES FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ON TRIAL 
The State called defendant's parole officer, Stephen Kelly, 
to establish that defendant was on parole for a felony, and 
therefore a "restricted person," on August 19th. On cross-
examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Kelly whether he had any 
other reported violations for defendant. Mr. Kelly responded 
that he had none (R. 582-83). 
Oi redirect, the State elicited testimony about the 
following reported parole violations: (1) aggravated assault for 
threatening Mr. Gunnel with a silver handgun; (2) unauthorized 
possession of the handgun and the shotgun; (3) aggravated assault 
for threatening Ms. Gregg with a shotgun on an occasion prior tc 
August 19th; (4) aggravated assault for striking Ms. Gregg; and 
(5) failure to report a change of address (R. 584-85). Defendant 
objected to questions about other violations, but the trial court 
allowed it because defense counsel opened the door to the inquiry 
(R. 583). 
On re-cross, defendant's trial counsel asked Mr. Kelly to 
explain what he meant when he initially testified he had had no 
problems with defendant. Mr. Kelly responded that the 
allegations he testified to on redirect only referred to the 
charges for which defendant was already on trial. (R. 586). 
Defendant now claims his trial counsel represented him 
ineffectively by asking a question that opened the door to 
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evidence of other conduct. Because defendant presents this claim 
for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, 
the Court reviews the claim as a question of law. State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). However, the 
Court's review of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential to avoid second-guessing counsel's performance "'on 
the basis of an inanimate record.'" State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 
590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
In order to prevail on this claim, defendant has the burden 
of establishing two elements. First, defendant must identify his 
counsel's acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and establish the acts or omissions 
breached that standard. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88, 690 (1984). However, the appellate courts must presume 
trial counsel "made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment," Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 687-88, and defendant can overcome that presumption only 
by showing there is a "'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' 
for counsel's actions," State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 
(Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 
1993) . 
Second, defendant must affirmatively prove that, but for the 
specifically identified acts or omissions, there would exist a 
"reasonable probability" of a more favorable result. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694. A "reasonable probability" is a 
probability sufficient to undermine this Court's confidence in 
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the outcome. Id. See also State v. Tyler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 
(Utah 1993); State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405-406 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1987). 
Defendant has established neither element. Defendant faults 
his trial counsel's question because it opened the door to 
evidence that he threatened Ms. Gregg with a shotgun, hit her, 
and changed his address without reporting it to his parole 
officer. Defendant claims that had his counsel adequately 
prepared, he would have realized this danger and avoided asking 
Mr. Kelly about prior parole violations. Appellant's Brief at 
16.6 
Defendant has failed to establish that counsel's question 
resulted from anything other than a prepared and reasoned 
tactical choice. Defendant's trial counsel first elicited 
testimony that defendant had no other parole violations (R. 582-
83). After the State elicited testimony about parole violations, 
defense counsel again succeeded in eliciting testimony, albeit 
incorrect, that defendant had no parole violations other than 
those arising from the charges against defendant (R. 586). 
Defense counsel may have believed the State would accept Mr. 
Kelly's original testimony at face value. Furthermore, Ms. Gregg 
6
 Defendant suggests the question negated the effective of 
severing the aggravated assault charge from the possession of a 
firearm charge. Appellant's Brief at 16. However, the information 
charged defendant with aggravated assault from threatening Mr. 
Gunnel1 with the chrome handgun (R. 6) . Because this evidence came 
in anyway to support the possession charge, defense counsel did not 
negate the severance the charges, even assuming the trial court 
severed the charges. See footnote 1. 
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completely undermined the contention that defendant had 
threatened her with a shotgun, specifically denying he had done 
so or that she reported such an incident to the police (R. 680-
82, 694) . Defense counsel may have known in advance that Ms. 
Gregg would deny the allegations, leaving only allegations that 
defendant had hit Ms. Gregg and failed to report an address 
change. Defense counsel may have viewed the violation for 
hitting Ms. Gregg and failing to notify about an address change 
as too insignificant to outweigh the benefit of eliciting 
evidence that defendant had no parole violations related to the 
possession of weapons, other than those for which he was on 
trial. 
Conversely, the record contains no affirmative evidence 
defense counsel merely overlooked the parole violations or 
blundered into them. Therefore, this record and defendant's 
appellate argument fail to overcome the presumption that defense 
counsel weighed the risks and benefits of asking Mr. Kelly about 
other parole violations and determined to ask the question anyway 
to present the jury with evidence that defendant had otherwise 
complied with the conditions of his parole. State v. Garrett, 
849 P.2d at 581 (finding the record inadequate to determine 
whether trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise a 
Batson challenge to the State's peremptory challenges because the 
law required this Court to presume defense counsel was acting 
properly and the record had no evidence to the contrary). 
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Defendant has also failed to establish that eliciting this 
testimony undermines confidence in the outcome. First, evidence 
that defendant threatened Mr. Gunnell with a handgun, and that 
defendant may have possessed a shotgun would have come in anyway 
to support the possession of a firearm charge. Second, even if 
evidence that defendant pointed a shotgun at Ms. Gregg, that he 
hit Ms. Gregg, and that he failed to change his address, would 
not have been introduced without defense counsel's question, the 
outcome would have been the same. Ms. Gregg's denial that 
defendant threatened her with a shotgun eliminated any possible 
prejudice from that allegation, and the other two allegations 
were too dissimilar from the charges at issue to make any 
difference in the outcome. Moreover, the State introduced 
consistent and uncontradicted evidence that defendant possessed a 
chrome semi-automatic handgun, and introduced evidence that 
defendant possessed all of the components of a shotgun. By 
contrast, defendant offered only the weak rebuttal testimony of 
Ms. Hawkins, who admitted she was not looking into the apartment 
when Mr. Gunnell and Ms. Gregg saw the handgun in defendant's 
hand. No reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would have 
acquitted had it not heard about defendant's failure to notify 
his parole officer of a change of address or that he struck Ms. 
Gregg. 
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POINT III 
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL 
Even though errors may not individually warrant reversal, 
this Court may still reverse where the errors cumulatively 
undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 
339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant claims that admission of the shotgun stock, shotgun 
shells, and holster, coupled with defense counsel's questioning 
of Mr. Kelly constitutes cumulative error. However, this claim 
fails for several reasons. First defendant fails to support it 
with any analysis. He merely asserts that if the individual 
errors do not warrant reversal, then the cumulative effect of 
them does, but he provides no explanation of why this is so. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the defendant's 
state constitutional challenge because defendant failed to 
provide any supporting legal authority or analysis). 
Second, for the reasons argued above, no error exists in 
this case. Specifically, the trial court properly admitted the 
physical evidence and defendant has not overcome the presumption 
that his trial counsel's examination of Mr. Kelly resulted from 
legitimate tactical considerations. Because the actions about 
which defendant complains do not constitute error, the Court need 
not consider whether the cumulative effect of these actions 
undermines confidence in the outcome. State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 
at 350 (finding that the trial record contained numerous, 
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individually harmless errors before concluding that the 
cumulative effect undermined confidence in the outcome). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / & day of /iJfiyjyuJstt^ , 
1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed by first-class mail, 
postage pre-paid, to the following on this 7 day of *^ rt/gt-<<^ S^ 
1994 
L. Clark Donaldson 
321 North 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-103 
76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.5, enacted by L. 
1974, ch. 32, § 33. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS the videotape of all bookings, including the de-
fendant's, was erased and recycled after 72 
Assault against peace officer. hours if there was no request to retain it, and 
Evidence of assault. th e defendant sought dismissal of the charge 
—Sufficient. th a t s n e > whi i e in custody, had assaulted a po-
Assault against peace officer. l i c e officer> because there was no showing that 
This section and § 76-5-102.4 do not pro- l o s s o f t h e **!* destroyed evidence vital to the 
scribe identical conduct when the assault is i s s u e °tthe defendant's guilt, the trial court 
against a peace officer. The statutes apply to e r r e (* in dismissing the assault charge. State v. 
different classes of persons, the former apply- Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577 (Utah (X App. 1988). 
ing to "any person" and the latter applying to Cuffi^ 'ow* 
"any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 " ? J * • r *i • *• • * * 
m*ih r+ An« lofted J u r v verdict, implicitly rejecting statutory 
luian L,t. App. ISB»;. defenses of self-defense and defense of habita-
Evidence of assault. tion, was supported by the evidence. State v. 
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Ct. App. 1989). 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. 76-1-601" for "deadly weapon" in Subsection 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; (l)(b) and made stylistic changes throughout 
1989, ch. 170, § 2. the section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- Cross-References. — Attempt, § 76-4-101. 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted Possession of a dangerous weapon with in-
"dangerous weapon as defined in Section tent to assault, § 76-10-507. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Victim. 
Recklessness. 
Dangerous weapon. Self-defense. 
Defense of habitation. Serious bodily injury. 
Evidence. Threatening with dangerous weapon distin-
—Sufficient. guished. 
Indictment or information. Voluntary intoxication. 
Instructions. Cited 
—Flight. 
Jury question. Dangerous weapon. 
Lesser included offense. Under former statute which described as-
Mental element, sault with deadly weapon, character of weapon 
Object of threat. could be inferred from wounds or other indicia, 
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History: C. 1953,76-10-307, enacted by L. sive, chemical, or incendiary device, knowing it 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-10-307; 1993, ch. 75, ( 2 . to be the device" for "infernal machine, knowing 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- it to be such" and made stylistic changes, 
ment, effective May 3,1993, substituted 'explo-
76-10-808. Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device — 
Venue of prosecution for shipping. 
Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly.delivers any explo-
sive, chemical, or incendiary device to any person for transmission without the 
consent or direction of the lawful possessor may be prosecuted in the county in 
which he delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted. 
His to r i c . 1953,76-10-308, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-308, 
1993, ch. 75, i 3. making construction or possession of an infer-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws nal machine a third-degree felony, and enacts 
1993, ch. 75, ( 3 repeals former § 76-10-308, as the present section, effective May 3,1993. 
76-10-309. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1993, ch. 75, ( 4 repeals tion for shipping an infernal machine, effective 
{ 76-10-309, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 196, May 3, 1993. For present comparable provi-
5 76-10-309, specifying the venue of prosecu- sions, see § 76-10-308. 
PART 4 
FENCES 
76-10-401. Fencing of shafts and wells. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Validity of statutes requiring the 
construction of fences — modern cases, 87 
ALJUth 1129. 
PART 5 
WEAPONS 
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions. 
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally 
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws 
throughout the state. 
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its 
political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may not enforce 
any rule in conflict with this part and there is a moratorium prohibiting 
local authorities from enacting or enforcing any new ordinance, regula-
tion, or rule pertaining to firearms until May 1, 1995, unless hereafter 
authorized by the Legislature by statute. 
(2) As used in this part: 
(a) "Crime of violence* means aggravated murder, murder, manslaugh-
ter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extor-
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tion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a 
dangerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these 
offenses. 
(b) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background 
check conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a 
handgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where 
the firearms dealer conducts business. 
(c) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The 
following factors shall be used in determining whether an item, object, or 
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; and 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used. 
(d) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under crimes and 
criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling, 
leasing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a 
retail or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise. 
(e) "Division" means the Law Enforcement and Technical Services 
Division of the Department of Public Safety, created in Section 53-5-103. 
(f) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle 
or sawed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a dangerous weapon 
from which is expelled a projectile by any force. 
(g) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form created by the 
division to be completed by a person purchasing, selling, or transferring a 
handgun from a dealer in the state. 
(h) "Handgun" means a firearm which has a short stock and is designed 
to be held and fired by the use of a single hand. 
(i) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is unlawful to discharge 
a firearm. 
(j) "Sawed-off shotgun" or "sawed-off rifle" means a shotgun having a 
barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches in length, or in the case of a rifle, 
having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any 
dangerous weapon made from a rifle or shotgun by alteration, modifica-
tion, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has an overall length of fewer 
than 26 inches. 
History: C. 1953,76-10-501, enacted by L. and (c) as present Subsections (2Xa) and (b); 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-10-501; 1974, ch. 32, § 27; added designations (bXi), (b)(ii), and (bXiii) to 
1985, ch. 35,6 1; 1991, ch. 10, ft 11; 1993, ch. Subsection (2); added present Subsection (2Xc); 
234, S 881; 1994, ch. 19, ( 1; 1994, ch. 151, rewrote Subsection (2)(d); substituted "firearm* 
§ 1. for "weapon* in Subsection (2Xe); inserted "or 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- 'sawed-off rifle'"and "dangerous*in Subsection 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, rearranged the (2Xf); and made stylistic changes throughout 
definitions in Subsection (2) so as to place them the section. 
in alphabetical order and in Subsection (2Xb) The 1994 amendment by ch. 19, effective 
substituted "aggravated murder, murder, man- February 28, 1994, added Subsections (2Kb), 
•laughter" for "murder, voluntary manslaugh- (d), (g), and (h), renumbering the remaining 
ter." subsections accordingly. 
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993, The 1994 amendment by ch. 151, effective 
deleted former Subsection (2Xa), defining "Bu- March 17,1994, substituted "enforce" for "enact 
reau"; redesignated former Subsections (2Xb) or enforce" in the second sentence in Subsection 
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(lXb) and added the second clause in that to consist of legislators and citizens represent-
sentence, imposing a moratorium on local reg- ing various specified interests, to study "which 
ulation of firearms. weapons laws should be under local control or 
This section is set out as reconciled by the state control; and any conflicts in state, local, 
Office of Legislative Research and General and federal weapons laws." The task force is to 
Counsel. report to the Judiciary Interim Committee by 
Weapons Task Force. — Laws 1994, ch. December 1994 and is repealed December 31, 
151, J§ 2 to 7 create the Weapons Task Force, 1994. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 
. . ,. 1^91). 
Constitutionality. 
•Dangerous weapon." -Dangerous weapon," 
Constitutionality. Defendant's two 10-inch knives with 5- and 
This section provided defendant adequate 6-inch blades and his 48-inch blowgun were 
notice that his knives and blowgun were "dan- "dangerous weapons" within the meaning of the 
gerous weapons," and was therefore not uncon- statute. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 
stitutionally vague as applied to him. State v. (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.T..R. — Fact that gun was broken, disman- sibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th 
tied, or inoperable as affecting criminal respon- 745. 
76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded. 
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or 
other weapon described in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when there 
is an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the firing position. 
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be loaded when an 
unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a position whereby the manual 
operation of any mech--*-:n once would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell, 
or projectile to be fire: 
(3) A muzzle loading n;turm shall be deemed to be loaded when it is capped 
or primed and has a powder charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders. 
History: C. 1953, 79-100-502, enacted by ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted the 
L. 1973, ch. 196, i 76-10-502; 1974, ch. 32, subsection designations (1) to (3); substituted 
I 28; 1990, ch. 828, § 1. "chapter" for "section" in Subsection (1); and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- made stylistic changes throughout. 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon/ 
handgun — Persons not permitted to have — 
Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
this part. 
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(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
History: C. 1953,76-10-503, enacted by L. 
P73, ch. 196, § 76-10-503; 1977, ch. 82, S 1; 
986, ch. 210, S 1; 1990, ch. 160, § 1; 1991, 
b.17,8 1; 1991, ch. 87,1 5; 1993, ch. 62, § 2; 
B94, ch. 19, § 2; 1994, ch. 149,ft 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
lent, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "or a 
iwfully admitted alien who has obtained a 
pedal hunting permit from the Department of 
ublic Safety" before "or any person" in the first 
antence in Subsection (lXa), inserted "or prob-
ation" and substituted "in a correctional facil-
y" for "at the Utah state prison or other like 
icility" in Subsection (2Xa), substituted "but" 
>r "and" in Subsection (2Xb), and made minor 
tylistic changes. 
The 1991 amendments, both effective April 
9,1991, made identical changes: in Subsection 
LXa), deleted "who is not either a citizen of the 
Jnited States or a lawfully admitted alien 
?hose business, occupation, or duties require 
he use of a dangerous weapon; or any person* 
allowing "person" and deleted the former sec-
ond sentence, which read "The Department of 
Public Safety shall adopt rules governing the 
issuance and use of special hunting permits for 
lawfully admitted aliens." 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
deleted "or is incarcerated in a correctional 
facility" after "felony" in Subsection (2Xa). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 19, effective 
February 28, 1994, added Subsection (3). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 149, effective 
May 2, 1994, substituted "this state" for "the 
state" in Subsection (lXa), "this subsection" for 
"this section" in Subsections (1Kb) and (2Xb), 
and "incendiary device" for "infernal machine" 
in Subsection (2Xb). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Federal Law. — The Brady Handgun Vio-
lence Prevention Act, cited in Subsection 
(3XaXv), is codified mainly as 18 U.S.C. § 921 
et seq. 
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n, because jurisdiction attached under the Certiorari. 
tute in effect when the petition for review When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
s filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n granted by this section, the Supreme Court 
Board of State Lands, 869 R2d 909 (Utah reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
•3). not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the 
formal adjudicative proceedings, P?* i e 8 ^ould address the decision of the Court 
ubdivision (3Xe)(iii) confers jurisdiction in ° f ^ ^ f t ^ ^ I ^ J ^ T ^ ^ 
Supreme Court only over final orders and Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 R2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
wi that originate in formal judicative
 C i t e d fa g U t o v Humphrey, 823 R2d 464 
eedings m agency actions. Southern Utah njtah 1991) 
erness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
stry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
le all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
Fhe Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
cutory appeals, over: 
[a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
>ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
brmal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
•vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board 
)il, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
i) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies, and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
irtment of a circuit court; 
interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
rt those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
ring a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
ns who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
t petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
first degree or capital felony; 
appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
g the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
ing a first degree or capital felony; 
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(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
0') appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
J986, ch. 47, S 46; 1987, ch. 161, S 804; 1988, 
jch. 73, S 1; 1988, ch. 210, 5 141; 1988, ch. 
248, S 8; 1990, ch. 80,5 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, S 45. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2Xh) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2Xi) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2Xh) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Scope. 
Cited. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus 
petition, in which defendant claimed only that 
his due process rights were violated at a hear-
ing before the parole board, lay to the Court of 
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the 
latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals 
of first degree or capital felony convictions and 
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the con-
viction or sentence is challenged. Padilla v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991). 
Scope. 
This statute does not authorize the Court of 
Appeals to review the orders of every adminis-
trative agency, but allows judicial review of 
agency decisions "when the legislature ex-
pressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional Li-
censing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App.), cert 
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1991). 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-4. 
78-3-11.5. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases 
to circuit court — Appeals — 
Jurisdiction when circuit and 
district court merged. 
State District Court Adminis-
trative System. 
Section 
78-3-16.5. 
78-3-21. 
78-3-21.5. 
Repealed. 
Judicial Council — Creation — 
Members — Terms and elec-
tion — Responsibilities — Re-
ports. 
Data bases for judicial boards. 
7 
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same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Allegation of facts required. to remand a claim under this rule for a fishing 
Because defendant did not allege any facts in expedition. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 
support of his inefifective assistance claim, the (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P. 943 (Utah 
appellate court would not remand the case for 1993). 
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisciicuon of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority for each issue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with 
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, 
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set 
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceed-
ings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of trie arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the 
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with 
the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (6), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs 
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
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actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as ' the employee," "the 
iiyured person," ' the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected. 
(f) Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If de-
termination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regu-
lations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under sub-
paragraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an 
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form. 
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document 
subject, to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the addendum. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive 
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any adden-
dum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as re-
quired by paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated 
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An origi-
nal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offend-
ing lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
must now contain for each issue raised on ap- ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the 
peal, a statement of the applicable standard of third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made sty-
review and citation of supporting authority. listic changes in Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78. 
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific 
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah 
L. Rev. 839. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of evidence of ab-
sence of other accidents or injuries at place 
where injury or damage occurred, 10 A.L.R.5th 
371. 
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case 
that victim was threatened by one other than 
defendant, 11 A.L.R.5th 831. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of 
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974) except that prior to the word 
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United 
States" have been added. 
Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also 
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state 
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of remoteness. 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Probability evidence. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Cited. 
Discretion of court 
The trial court is given considerable discre-
tion in deciding whether or not evidence sub-
mitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
While relevant evidence is generally admis-
sible, a trial court has broad discretion to de-
termine whether proffered evidence is rele-
vant, and the appellate court will find error in 
a relevancy ruling only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
Effect of remoteness. 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984). 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another 
participant in the crime had no bearing on de-
fendant's guilt or innocence and was properly 
excluded as not relevant to defendant's partici-. 
pation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667 
P.2d 586 (Utah 1983). 
Probability evidence. 
Courts have routinely excluded probability 
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to 
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical 
conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence 
before it and decide where truth lies. State v. 
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
Scientific evidence. 
The Frye test (that scientific tests still in the 
experimental stages should not be admitted in 
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced 
from a well recognized scientific principle or 
discovery is admissible if the scientific princi-
ple is sufficiently established) is a valid test, 
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for 
determining when scientific evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted and is not incon-
sistent with Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Kofford v. Flora, 744 
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987). 
Standard of review. 
The judgment of the trial court admitting or 
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless 
it is shown that the discretion exercised 
therein has been abused. Terry v. Zions Coop. 
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), 
overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. 
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Cited in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — United States v. 
Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the 
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839. 
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA 
Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 
The Mysterious Creation of Search and Sei-
zure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitu-
tions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 
751. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evalu-
ation test results or of statements made during 
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202. 
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior 
misidentification of accused in connection with 
commission of crime similar to that presently 
charged, 50 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Products liability: admissibility of evidence 
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Rule 403 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 492 
Thermographic tests: admissibility of test re-
sults in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1105. 
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination 
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143. 
Products liability: admissibility of experi-
mental or test evidence to disprove defect in 
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125. 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402 
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise." 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
ANALYSIS 
Balancing test. 
Bias. 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Credibility of witness. 
Cumulative evidence. 
Determination of admissibility. 
Expert testimony. 
Film of murder scene. 
Guilty plea. 
Harmless error. 
Impeachment of witness. 
Inflammatory evidence. 
Offensive remarks. 
Other offenses. 
Photographic evidence. 
Prior convictions. 
—Impeachment. 
Psychiatric history and drug abuse. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Tape recordings. 
—Defendant's admissions. 
—Videotapes in pornography trial. 
Unfairly prejudicial. 
Victim's testimony. 
Cited. 
Balancing test. 
The balancing test of this rule excludes mat-
ter of scant or cumulative probative force, 
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prej-
udicial effect. State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary blood-
stains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588. 
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related 
offense, of results of tests o.a semen or seminal 
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897. 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or 
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927. 
Admissibility of DNA identification evi-
dence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313. 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following 
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Bias. 
The right to cross-examine regarding bias is 
limited by this rule. State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987). 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant, 
may nevertheless be excluded if the usefulness 
of the evidence is more than counterbalanced 
by its disadvantageous effects in confusing the 
issues before the jury, or in creating an undue 
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative 
weight. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Credibility of witness. 
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial 
judge to substitute his assessment of the credi-
bility of testimony for that of the jury by ex-
cluding testimony simply because he does not 
find it credible. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036,108 S. 
Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1988). 
Cumulative evidence. 
While there may have been little reason to 
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded 
conversations between the defendant and a 
government informant because the evidence 
was cumulative, their admission was not preju-
dicial because the transcripts merely repeated 
the informant's in-court testimony. State v. 
Knowles, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah 1985). 
Determination of admissibility. 
Although the relevancy of proffered evidence 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
